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I. Introduction 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has 
been the biggest federal appellate court in terms of numerous 
significant parameters for nearly two decades. The 9th Circuit 
encompasses the largest geographic expanse, extending from the 
Arctic Circle to the border of Mexico and from Montana to Guam. 
The appeals court includes 15 federal districts that are located in 
eight western states, as well as Hawaii and two island territories. 
The 9th Circuit addresses the most substantial and most complex 
docket, consisting of approximately 9,000 cases annually. Congress 
has authorized 28 active appellate judges for the court. Moreover, 
the enormous number and complicated character of 9th Circuit 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Patricia Carney, Michael Higdon, and 
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for processing this 
piece. Errors that remain are mine. 
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filings has prompted the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
the policy-making arm of the federal courts, to suggest that senators 
and representatives approve nine additional judgeships for the 9th 
Circuit. The court presently has six openings, five of which the 
Judicial Conference designates as ')udicial emergencies" because the 
seats have remained empty for at least 18 months, even as the 
magnitude and complexity of civil and criminal caseloads in the 9th 
Circuit continue to increase. President Bill Clinton nominated 
candidates for all five of these vacancies in 1999; however, the 
United States Senate had confirmed no one for the empty seats when 
the initial session of the 106th Congress recessed. 
Throughout much of the 1990s, the 9th Circuit has operated 
with fewer than the court's complete complement of 28 active 
judges. Since 1995, when Republican senators representing states of 
the Pacific Northwest instituted a serious campaign to divide the 9th 
Circuit, the court has essentially functioned absent one-fourth of its 
membership. 1 The large number of openings and their protracted 
nature, as well as a steadily expanding docket, have demanded that 
the 9th Circuit depend on many appellate and district court judges 
who are not active members of the 9th Circuit when staffing three-
judge panels to hear cases. In fact, the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals ("The Commission"), 
which recently completed a thorough study of the appellate courts, 
determined that 43% of panels that resolved cases after oral 
argument in the 9th Circuit during the 1997 fiscal year included at 
least one participant who was not an active judge of the court.2 
This Commission apparently premised its major 
recommendation that Congress and the President require three 
regionally-based adjudicatory divisions for the 9th Circuit on the 
1. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Final Report 30 (Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that the circuit had only 18 active judges 
out of 28 authorized judgeships for most of the four years preceding the report). 
See generally Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First 
Century, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1999) (discussing the origins of the Commission 
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and its efforts in 
compiling a report and recommendations related to the 9th Circuit). 
2. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing this court's use of 
visiting judges to constitute panels); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1994) 
(prescribing the means for assigning a federal district court judge to temporarily sit 
on the circuit court in which the district is located). 
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perception that the court may decide appeals too slowly, that circuit 
case law might lack consistency and coherence, that the court's 
judges could be insufficiently collegial, and that circuit links with the 
regions served seem inadequate. Insofar as the deficiencies that the 
commissioners perceived actually exist, however, they may be 
ascribed more appropriately to the significant number and prolonged 
character of the vacancies that the court has experienced over the last 
half decade. Indeed, the expeditious appointment of judges to the six 
empty seats might obviate the necessity for implementing an 
untested divisional approach, which could well disrupt many 
efficacious aspects of 9th Circuit administration. These 
considerations mean that the judicial openings on the court deserve 
assessment. This Article undertakes that effort. 
Section II evaluates the national judicial vacancies problem, 
focusing on how circumstances in the 9th Circuit became so 
problematic. Section III analyzes recent developments that have 
permitted nearly one-quarter of the 28 active judgeships that senators 
and representatives have authorized for the court to remain unfilled. 
Finding that the burgeoning number and increasing complexity of 
civil and criminal appeals and the substantial difficulty of promptly 
appointing judges to the empty positions is seriously threatening 
appellate justice, Section IV offers recommendations for addressing 
this situation. These recommendations may also apply to other 
federal circuits experiencing similar judicial vacancies. 
II. Origins and Development of the Judicial Vacancies Problem 
The beginnings and growth of the judicial selection 
controversy that currently exists in the 9th Circuit may appear to 
require relatively little consideration here because numerous 
observers have already assessed certain important dimensions of the 
applicable historical background.3 However, comparatively 
3. See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER 
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997) (discussing the 
judicial selection of lower court judges, the changes that have occurred over the 
years, and the impact of these changes on the judiciary); Gordon Bennant et al., 
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 
MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994) (discussing appointment of judges and providing 
statistical analysis of judicial vacancies from 1970 to 1992); Carl Tobias, Federal 
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998) 
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thorough examination is warranted in order to elucidate how the 
existing conditions materialized and how the circumstances could be 
rectified or ameliorated. 
The rather large number of vacancies that the 9th Circuit is 
presently encountering, and their relatively extended character, 
illustrates much broader phenomena that have adversely affected 
most of the federal court system. Most of the appeals courts and 
many of the 94 federal districts have encountered what may be 
described as a permanent vacancies complication for approximately 
two decades. This problem, which can be ascribed primarily to 
political phenomena, has seemingly resulted from the inability of 
Chief Executives to nominate candidates and the reluctance of the 
Senate to confirm judges quickly enough to fill the substantial 
number of openings that have arisen. 
A. Persistent Vacancies 
The initial manifestations of the persistent vacancies 
conundrum occurred during the 1960s, when members of Congress 
began enlarging the civil and criminal jurisdiction that lawmakers 
accorded the federal district courts. 4 Senators and representatives 
recognized numerous new civil causes of action and federalized 
many additional areas of criminal law, 5 while attorneys and litigants 
evinced greater willingness to appeal district court determinations. 6 
(examining the history of federal judicial selection, the complication presented by 
vacancies, and the possible solutions for vacancies that might be employed). 
4. See Bermant, supra note 3, at 323-33 (discussing such expansion); see also 
Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 
CORNELLL. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (noting an expansion of federal district court 
jurisdiction since the 1960s). 
5. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 
83 Stat. 852 (1970); Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 
Stat. 1590 (1970); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 
(1984); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
6. See JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 17-35 (Federal Judicial Center 1993) (analyzing 
factors leading to the rise in number of civil cases filed in the federal courts of 
appeals); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (noting 
that federal courts are in a "crisis of volume" as a result of a "swollen caseload."). 
But cf. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Working Papers 133 (1998) (finding that growth was fueled by increasing appeals 
in only a few case types). 
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These phenomena led to significant growth in civil and criminal 
district and appellate dockets. 
Congress correspondingly attempted to address multiplying 
caseloads by authorizing considerably more district and appeals 
court judgeships. Nevertheless, presidents and senators have 
experienced complications in approving nominees for all of the 
openings, partly because the judiciary' s expansion has created 
additional vacancies that have happened with increasing frequency. 
For instance, during most of the administrations of Presidents Bill 
Clinton and George Bush, the federal bench encountered numerous 
empty seats; when the second session of the 106th Congress 
convened in January 2000, there were 76 unfilled judgeships. 
This permanent openings problem has had special 
ramifications in the 9th Circuit for several important reasons. This 
appeals court has confronted the largest docket in the appellate 
system since 1980, when Congress split the former 5th Circuit into 
the new 5th and 11th Circuits.7 Senators and representatives passed 
legislation in 1978 that empowered every appeals court having a 
membership that exceeds 15 active judges to implement special 
measures, including administrative units and limited en bane 
procedures, which lawmakers intended would facilitate the 
disposition of mounting appellate caseloads. 8 Since that time, the 
9th Circuit has employed administrative units that have enhanced 
efficiency, and it has been the only appeals court to employ the 
limited en bane process.9 
7. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (providing for the 
reorganization of the former 5th Circuit into the 5th and 11th Circuits). See 
generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988) 
(discussing the splitting of the 5th Circuit and the policy and the implications 
behind the division); HARVEY COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-
1981 (1984) (tracing the establishment, composition, and decisions of the 5th 
Circuit). 
8. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, 
supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981). 
9. See JOE CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE 
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS Project 13-14, 41-45 (1985) 
(discussing steps taken in the 9th Circuit to more efficiently handle its docket); 
Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 Emory L.J. 1357, 1363 
(1995) (descnbing the 9th Circuit's implementation of the limited en bane 
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A different provision of the 1978 statute authorized 10 
additional judicial positions for the 9th Circuit, 10 while President 
Jimmy Carter undertook extraordinary efforts to fill the judgeships 
by naming 13 members for the court in 1979 and 1980.11 Enactment 
of another judgeship bill in 1984 brought the 9th Circuit to its 
existing complement of 28 active judges, 12 so that the tribunal has 
many more members than the remaining appellate courts and 
experiences openings with much greater frequency. 
B. The Current Vacancies Conundrum 
There is a related conundrum involving the 70 empty seats on 
the federal appeals and district courts, which somewhat resembles 
the permanent openings problem, but differs in several significant 
ways. An impasse in processing judicial nominations, apparently 
resulting from political considerations, derives principally from 
control of the White House and the Senate by the Democratic and 
Republican political parties. The impasse may concomitantly result 
from the inability or reluctance of the president and senators, as well 
as their assistants, in fulfilling their obligations to nominate 
candidates and confirm judges for the federal bench. 
Notwithstanding who may be responsible for, or who could 
have prevented, the permanent openings problem and the recent 
confirmation impasse, these developments have led to a large 
number of vacancies on the federal appellate and district courts, 
including six empty positions on the 9th Circuit. These vacancies 
have had numerous detrimental impacts. Many federal district courts 
have encountered backlogs on their civil dockets - some district 
judges have not conducted trials in any civil lawsuits during the past 
two years, a phenomenon that can partly be attributed to the 
mechanism); see also Commission Final Report, supra note l, at 21, 32 (noting 
this circuit's usage of these administrative devices). 
10. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3, 92 Stat. 1629, 1632 (1978). 
11. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 236-84 (discussing President 
Carter's approach to federal judicial appointments). 
12. See Banlauptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 347 (adding five additional circuit judges); see 
also Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the creation and 
size of this circuit court in terms of geographical area and number of authorized 
judgeships). 
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requirement in the Speedy Trial Act that judges promptly resolve 
criminal cases. 13 
Practically all of the appellate courts have correspondingly 
had to rely with considerably enhanced frequency on judges who are 
not active members of the appeals courts, a circumstance that may 
have adversely affected judicial collegiality and could even have 
undermined the uniformity of circuit law. The Commission found 
that one-third of the three-judge panels that decided cases in the 
appellate system during 1997 had at least one member who was not 
an active judge of the particular appeals court.14 The Commission 
further determined that the 11th Circuit had so constituted an 
astounding 64% of the court's panels and that the 9th Circuit had so 
comprised 43 % of its panels. 15 
Appellate court judges have also depended more substantially 
on circuit administrative employees. Illustrative are the efforts of 
staff attorneys, who often preliminarily screen cases. With 48 staff 
attorneys, the 9th Circuit relies on the largest contingent of these 
support personnel. 16 Appellate courts have also sharply restricted the 
percentage of oral arguments and written decisions they have 
allowed. The Commission determined that 40% of appeals pursued 
nationally in 1997 received oral argument; however, the 3rd, 4th, 
10th, and 11th Circuits conducted oral argument in only 30% of their 
cases.17 The Commission concomitantly found that 23% of appeals 
across the country during 1997 received published opinions, but that 
five aprellate courts issued these opinions in fewer than 19% of their 
cases.1 
13. See Speedy Trial Act of1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994) (requiring the 
commencement of a federal criminal trial within 70 days of the filing of the 
indictment); see also ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT 
ANNUAL REPORT (1994) (supplying data on backlogs); Robert Schmidt, The Costs 
of Judicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 28, 1997, at 6 (ascribing backlogs to judicial 
vacancies). 
14. Commission Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108, table 6a. 
15. See id. (indicating the percentages of visiting judges that participate in 
decisions at the circuit level). 
16. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 24 (listing, in Table 2-8, the 
various circuit courts' use of central staff attorneys). 
17. See id. at 22 (stating that 9th Circuit conducted oral argument in 39% of 
cases). 
18. See id. (stating that the 9th Circuit issued published opinions in 18% of 
cases). 
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The permanent judicial vacancies complication and the 
present confirmation problem have had numerous other detrimental 
impacts on the 9th Circuit. Perhaps most instructive, these 
difficulties led the court to postpone 600 oral arguments it had 
scheduled in 1997.19 
III. Developments Since 1995 
The third part of this Article considers the significant number 
and prolonged nature of empty judgeships on the 9th Circuit. 
A. Developments Between 1995and1997 
For most of the two decades since 1978, when senators and 
representatives authorized significant increases in the judicial 
complement of the 9th Circuit, the court experienced relatively few 
openings. The vacancies only rose to comparatively disturbing 
levels, and the seats began to remain empty for extended periods, in 
1995, when filling judgeships became enmeshed with the ongoing 
controversial debate over the possible division of the 9th Circuit. 
In May 1995, Republican members of the Senate, who 
represented states that are located in the Pacific Northwest, 
orchestrated the fifth serious effort since 1983 to bifurcate the 9th 
Circuit. 20 The senators proposed legislation that would have placed 
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a projected 
12th Circuit, leaving the remaining states and territories of the 
19. See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37 
(noting that the criminal caseload is pushing civil cases to the back of the queue); 
see also Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice on Hold, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 13, 1997, at A9 (observing that the 6th Circuit was 
required to cancel 60 arguments in 1997 and commenting on the deleterious effects 
of the vacancies on the 9th Circuit); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams 
Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 (reporting on 9th 
Circuit judges' frustration with congressional delay in filling judicial vacancies). 
20. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b) (1995) (authorizing a study of 
structure and alignment of the 9th Circuit); see also Thomas E. Baker, On 
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries - Why the Proposal to Divide the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
917 (1990) (recounting a history of prior efforts to split the circuit). See generally 
Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 9 (discussing the need to fill vacancies on 
the 9th Circuit). 
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current 9th Circuit in this court.21 Upon Senate Bill 956's 
introduction, Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) declared that he 
would place a hold on all nominees for the 9th Circuit until Congress 
bifurcated the court. Senator Burns only released this hold in 
January 1996, when the Senate confirmed Judge A. Wallace 
Tashima and Judge Sidney Thomas for the 9th Circuit. 22 However, 
there were no appointments to the court throughout the remainder of 
the 1996 presidential election year or in 1997, the first year of the 
Clinton Administration's final term. 
During 1996 and 1997, eight active appellate judges on the 
9th Circuit chose to assume senior status or to retire, thereby leaving 
empty seats. Both Democratic and Republican Chief Executives had 
named these members to the court. Certain jurists seemed to honor 
an informal understanding whereby judges take senior status or retire 
during the administration of a President who is a member of the 
same political party as the Chief Executive who appointed that 
judicial officer. This notion may explain why a small number of 
Democratic appointees assumed senior status near the beginning of 
1996, thus theoretically permitting President Clinton to select their 
successors. Some judges whom Republican Chief Executives placed 
on the 9th Circuit may have awaited the outcome of the 1996 
elections to determine whether the Republican candidate would 
become President; those jurists may have chosen to assume senior 
status after that event did not occur rather than serve another four 
years.23 
There are a few reasons why only two judges received 
appointment to the 9th Circuit between May 1995 and January 1998. 
One important explanation was that the Senate could not approve 
nominees for the court after Senator Burns imposed his hold on 
confirmations because a single member can delay the whole Senate's 
21. S. 956, supra note 20. 
22. See David G. Savage, Political Logjam on Filling Vacant Judgeships 
Broken, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1998, atA17 (concluding that ChiefJustice Rehnquist 
helped to break the political impasse that was delaying appointments to the 9th 
Circuit); Legislator Imperils All 9th Circuit Nominations, S.F. DAILY J., June 8, 
1995, at 1 (reporting that "[Senator] Burns ... feel[s] that the court is too unwieldy 
... dominated by Californians and too slow .... "). See generally, Orrin Hatch, 
Judicial Nominees: The Senate's Steady Progress, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1998, at 
C9 (reporting on the Senate's progress in confirming nominees to the 9th Circuit). 
23. An active judge is eligible for senior status when the total of the judge's 
age and years of service is 80. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
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action under its unanimous consent procedure. When Senator Burns 
removed his hold during early 1996, the Senate was able to approve 
Judge Tashima and Judge Thomas.24 
The upper chamber, however, confirmed no other nominees 
for the 9th Circuit in 1996.25 The clearest and most persuasive 
explanation for this inactivity was that 1996 was a presidential 
election year. Thus, during the initial five months of 1996, Senator 
Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who was serving as Senate majority leader 
and attempting to capture the Republican Party presidential 
nomination, may have been unwilling to schedule floor votes on 
appeals court nominees because doing so could have evidenced a 
lack of confidence in his own presidential candidacy. 
Once Senator Dole resigned from the Senate in June and 
Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) became the majority leader, there 
ensued a period when Senator Lott appeared to proceed cautiously in 
exercising his responsibilities as the new majority leader. By the 
time that Senator Lott seemingly was prepared to schedule floor 
debate and floor votes on nominees, it had become mid-summer of 
an election year, a period when the confirmation process 
conventionally slows in anticipation of the presidential campaign. 
The Republican Party's hopes that Senator Dole would defeat 
President Clinton and enable the GOP to fill numerous judicial 
openings, as well as Senator Lott's apparent unwillingness to 
undermine confidence in the Dole candidacy by expeditiously 
scheduling votes on judicial nominees, might have further delayed 
confirmation. 
Notwithstanding these complications during the summer of 
1996, the Republican and Democratic leadership in the Senate 
ultimately agreed on a procedure for processing nominees that 
enabled senators to consider one nominee per day on the Senate floor 
until the Labor Day recess. That understanding permitted 13 district 
court judges to secure confirmation. A few appellate court nominees 
did have hearings before the Judiciary Committee in 1996, but no 
judges apart from Judges Tashima and Thomas were appointed to 
any appeals court, including the 9th Circuit. 
24. Savage, supra note 22. 
25. A few nominees secured committee hearings or committee votes, but 
none received full Senate consideration. 
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Relevant developments respecting the court's possible 
bifurcation also occurred at this time. fu March 1996, advocates of 
the proposal to divide the 9th Circuit determined they had 
insufficient support to approve the bill.26 Accordingly, these 
Republican senators assembled a compromise that would have 
authorized a national commission to evaluate the federal appeals 
courts.27 The measure easily passed the Senate; however, the House 
of Representatives did not promptly consider the proposal. Congress 
eventually appropriated $500,000 for the assessment, but it failed to 
adopt authorizing legislation.28 
During 1997, members of the Senate and the House offered 
several study commission bills.29 On June 3, the House agreed to 
legislation that would have authorized an analysis of the federal 
courts system.30 fu late July, the Senate approved an appropriations 
rider that would have split the 9th Circuit.31 During November, 
Congress passed a measure that prescribed a national examination of 
the appellate courts, with particular emphasis on the 9th Circuit, 
which President Clinton signed into law. 3 
26. See Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 
SMU L. REV. 583, 589 (1997) (detailing the legislative history of the proposal to 
split the 9th Circuit); see also 142 CONG. REC. S2219-S2303 (Mar. 18, 1996) 
(reflecting the numerous state bar resolutions and Senate speeches opposing the 
division of the 9th Circuit); S. 956, supra notes 20-21 and text accompanying notes 
(recounting the debate whether to split the 9th Circuit into two courts). 
27. See 142 CONG. REC. § 2236 (Mar. 18, 1996) (discussing the proposal of 
and reproducing the text of the amendment). 
28. See 142 CONG. REC. H11,859 (Sept. 28, 1996) (authorizing the funding of 
a commission to study the federal courts of appeals). 
29. See, e.g., S. 248, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997); S. 283, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (1997) 
(discussing commissions to study the federal court system and to recommend 
possible changes). 
30. See H.R. 908, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1997) (establishing the 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals); see 
also Carl Tobias, House Authorizes Appellate Court Study Commission, 80 
JUDICATURE 292 (1997) (discussing the legislative history of the Commission). 
31. See S. 1022, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. § 305 (1997) (proposing the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1997); see also Carl Tobias, 
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 212-
14 (1997) (discussing the history of the attempt to bifurcate the 9th Circuit). 
32. See Act ofNov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 
2491-92 (1997) (formally establishing a study to report on the appellate courts); 
see also Carl Tobias, Congress Authorizes Appellate Study Panel, 81 JUDICATURE 
125 (1997) (discussing the Commission's mandate, the challenges it faces, and 
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In 1997, the Senate failed to confirm any judges for the 9th 
Circuit. The reluctance to approve judges for the court could be 
attributed to the machinations that involved the ongoing controversy 
over splitting the 9th Circuit. For instance, the more vacancies the 
court encounters, and the longer that they remain unfilled, the greater 
the problems the 9th Circuit will experience in expeditiously 
resolving cases and the more circuit members who may believe that 
they should accede to bifurcation.33 However, it is exceedingly 
difficult to prove that senatorial proponents of division were using 
delay or refusal to approve judges as a strategy for imposing pressure 
on the 9th Circuit and promoting its bifurcation. 
The relatively small number of individuals who were 
appointed to the 9th Circuit in 1996 and 1997 can also be explained 
by the then-current dispute over confirming federal judges for the 80 
vacancies that existed. For example, President Clinton may have 
tendered too few nominees whom Republican members of the Senate 
deemed acceptable, especially in early 1997. Moreover, Senator 
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), who was the chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, might have conducted an inadequate number of hearings 
and committee votes on the nominees whom the Chief Executive had 
submitted. Majority Leader Lott concomitantly did not schedule 
floor votes and floor debates on candidates who had received Senate 
Judiciary Committee approval. In short, all of the people and entities 
responsible for choosing judges could have undertaken greater 
efforts to expedite the selection process. For instance, during early 
1997, President Clinton re-nominated three persons whom the Senate 
had previously refused to approve. 34 Nonetheless, the Chief 
suggested a review strategy). The study's authorization should have temporarily 
removed the issue of 9th Circuit division as an obstacle to the confirmation of 
judges for the court. 
33. See generally Hatch, supra note 22 (denying that there is any crisis created 
by the vacancies on the 9th Circuit); Carol M. Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to 
Carve Up 9th Circuit- NW States Would Be in New District, SEATILE TIMES, Nov. 
2, 1997, at Al (reporting that critics of the 9th Circuit support dividing the court as 
a solution to its loaded docket while opponents of splitting the circuit blame the 
Senate's slow confirmation process for the burdensome court docket); David G. 
Savage, Debate Rises Over Proposal to Break Up Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 1997, at A3 (noting that the best way to relieve the 9th Circuit docket 
would be for the Senate to quicken its response to vacancies on the court). 
34. They were Professor William Fletcher, practicing attorney Margaret 
McKeown, and District Judge Richard Paez. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates Twenty-Two to the Federal Bench 
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Executive only forwarded two other nominees in late June and July35 
and subsequently proposed two additional individuals for vacancies 
on the 9th Circuit during November.36 President Clinton may have 
considered efforts to submit more candidates fruitless in light of the 
rather slow pace at which the Senate was considering nominees. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee accordingly held hearings on only one 
ofseven candidates for the 9th Circuit, who later asked that his name 
be withdrawn, 37 as well as hearings on another nominee to the 9th 
Circuit on whom the Senate did not vote before it recessed. 38 
Disputes over filling specific openings also arose. For 
example, Republican senators from Arizona and Washington 
contended that they must be involved in suggesting persons for 
vacancies in their respective states and even claimed that they were 
entitled to proffer the recommendations. 39 These developments 
(Jan. 7, 1997) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-es/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; see 
also Hatch, supra note 22 (noting that President Clinton had renominated two 
candidates from the previous Congress). 
35. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton 
Nominates James S. Ware to the Federal Bench (June 27, 1997) 
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; THE 
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates 
Susan Graber to the Federal Bench (July 30, 1997) 
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>. 
36. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President 
Clinton Nominates Three to the Federal Bench (November 9, 1997) 
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/> 
(announcing the nominations of Ronald M. Gould and Barry G. Silverman). 
37. This was Judge Ware. See David G. Savage & Maura Dolan, Judge 
Admits Tale of Brother's Death Was a Lie, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1997, at Al 
(reporting that Judge Ware, who was expected to win Senate confirmation easily, 
withdrew his nomination). 
38. This was Magistrate Judge Silverman, whom the Senate later confirmed 
in January 1998. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, supra note 36; Arizonan Gets 
9th Circuit Seat, THE TuCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C (announcing that the 
Senate had confirmed Barry Silverman's nomination). 
39. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (recounting 
Sen. Biden's support of the practice of conferring with a senator before judges 
from that senator's state are nominated); see also Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree 
on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997, at Bl (reporting on 
the concessions that Republican Senator Gorton had won from his Democratic 
counterpart, Sen. Patty Murray); Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has A Chance to Shape 
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 1 (reporting that Republican Senators 
were considering a proposal to insist that the President cede half of the judicial 
appointments to the Republican majority). 
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significantly delayed nominations for openings in Arizona and 
Washington; however, compromises seemingly were struck, and the 
President tendered nominees for the two vacancies during November 
1997.40 
B. Developments Since 1998 
The pace of nomination and confirmation quickened 
somewhat nationally and in the 9th Circuit during 1998.41 Relatively 
close cooperation between President Clinton and Senator Hatch 
contributed to the appointment of 65 federal judges, five of whom 
assumed positions on the 9th Circuit. Judges William Fletcher, 
Susan Graber, Margaret McKeown, Barry Silverman, and Kim 
Wardlaw received appointments to the court in 1998.42 fudeed, at 
one juncture during that year, the 9th Circuit experienced as few as 
five vacancies. 
An important explanation for the success in naming judges to 
the 9th Circuit during 1998 was that the Chief Executive steadily 
nominated candidates for openings as seats became empty. For 
instance, President Clinton promptly submitted the names of 
practicing attorney Marsha Berzon and District Judge Wardlaw upon 
the Senate's return for the second session of the 105th Congress.43 
Moreover, a comparatively large number of judges secured 
appointment to the 9th Circuit because of Senator Hatch's 
willingness to hold Judiciary Committee hearings and panel votes on 
nominees. Senator Lott correspondingly evidenced greater 
willingness to schedule floor debate and votes on candidates whom 
the Judiciary Committee had approved. Finally, the nominations of 
Judge Fletcher and Judge McKeown had been pending for several 
40. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates Three 
to Federal Bench, supra note 36 (announcing nominees Magistrate Judge Barry 
Silverman and practicing attorney Ronald Gould). 
41. See Carl Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 315 (1999) (reviewing the Clinton administration's record of judicial 
appointments of women and minorities); see also Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nominee 
Confirmations Smoother Now, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A 
(stating that the nomination and confirmation process was working more 
effectively). 
42. Tobias, Leaving a Legacy, supra note 41, at 325-26. 
43. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton 
Nominates Twelve to the Federal Bench and One to the D.C. Court of Appeals 
(Jan. 27, 1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>. 
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years because some senators apparently found their candidacies to be 
controversial; however, once the entire Senate considered these 
individuals, they won confirmation rather easily.44 
Despite the relative success in judicial selection nationally 
and in the 9th Circuit during 1998, another impasse arose in early 
1999.45 Shortly after the first session of the 106th Congress 
convened, President Clinton re-nominated four candidates and chose 
Chief Justice Barbara Durham of the Washington Supreme Court for 
the fifth empty seat. 46 During March, the Chief Executive forwarded 
a sixth nomination but did not submit a candidate for the seventh 
opening until the summer of 1999. 47 
The Senate confirmed two judges for positions on the 
Northern District of Illinois during the spring. Nevertheless, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee delayed scheduling hearings on 
additional nominees for any of the courts until the summer of 1999, 
although 35 judges eventually received appointments in that year. 
Moreover, the Senate approved judges for two of the seven openings 
on the 9th Circuit during 1999. 
The major obstacle to judicial selection in 1999 was 
apparently a dispute that involved a vacancy on the district court in 
44. See 144 CONG. REc. Sll,872 et seq. (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (outlining 
the Fletcher debate); Id. at Sl 1,882 et seq. (outlining the McKeown debate). 
45. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE 
FEDERALJUDICIARY (June 14, 1999). 
46. The four were practicing attorneys Marsha Berzon, Barry Goode, Ronald 
Gould, and District Judge Richard Paez. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS 
SECRETARY, President Nominates Seventeen to the Federal Bench (Jan. 26, 1999) 
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>. Justice 
Durham later requested that her name be withdrawn because her spouse became 
ill. See Neil A. Lewis, A Nomination is Withdrawn, and a Deal is Threatened, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A18 {discussing the unusual political environment 
that led to President Clinton's appointment of a conservative Republican to the 9th 
Circuit); Danny Westneat, Judge Won't Seek Higher Post, SEATTLE TIMES, May 
28, 1999, at Bl (questioning if the White House would allow Sen. Gorton the 
freedom to select another candidate after Justice Durham's withdrawal). 
47. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton 
Nominates Raymond C. Fisher and Adalberto Jose Jordan to the Federal Bench 
(Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; 
THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton 
Nominates Maryanne Trump Barry, James E. Duffy, Jr., and Elena Kagan to the 
Federal Bench (June 17, 1999)<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>. 
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Utah, the state which Senator Hatch represents.48 During January, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee chair began "demanding that the 
president nominate a conservative aide to Republican Governor 
Mike Leavitt as a federal judge in Salt Lake City."49 The 
controversy was seemingly exacerbated because the candidate was a 
"self-described Ronald Reagan conservative whose views on the 
environment are anathema to Clinton and to environmental and other 
liberal groups that are politically important to the administration"50 
and because Utah Democrats strongly opposed the individual's 
nomination. 51 The Chief Executive ultimately acceded to the 
committee chair's request. Several federal courts observers assert 
that this six-month stalemate explains the failure to confirm any 
nominees apart from the lawyers who were named to the Northern 
District of Illinois. 52 
Additional, less salient factors might have slowed judicial 
appointments. For example, the President may have sporadically 
submitted too few candidates whom Republican members of the 
Senate considered acceptable, especially in the early part of 1999. 
At the same time, Senator Hatch held no hearings, much less 
permitted committee votes, before mid-June on nominees whom the 
administration had forwarded. The inability or unwillingness to 
48. See Joan Biskupic, Hatch, White House at Impasse on Judgeships, WASH. 
POST, June 5, 1999, at Al (reporting that Senator Hatch was delaying the 
consideration of 42 nominees to the federal bench as leverage in his bid to have 
Ted Stewart nominated); Paul Elias, Berzon 's Ninth Circuit Bid Looks Good, THE 
RECORDER, June 17, 1999, at 1 (stating that Senator Hatch had ''bottled up the 
confirmation process" by refusing to hold hearings on any of the pending judicial 
nominations due to the Senator's anger at President Clinton's refusal to nominate 
Stewart, who was then acting as Utah Governor Mike Leavitt's chief of staff); 
Judy Fahys, Utahn is Bottleneck in U.S. Judge Pipeline, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, May 
17, 1999, at Al (reporting on the impasse over the nomination for the vacant 
judgeship in Utah); David G. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant Over Utah Tug 
of War, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at Al (discussing the political controversy 
concerning the possible nomination of Republican Ted Stewart). 
49. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al; see also 
Biskupic, supra note 48 (discussing the controversy swirling around the impasse 
over the Stewart nomination); Fahys, supra note 48, at Al (describing the 
controversy surrounding Stewart's nomination). 
SO. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al. 
51. Elias, supra note 48, at 1; Fahys, supra note 48, at Al. 
52. Biskupic, supra note 48, at A6; Elias, supra note 48, at 1; Fahys, supra 
note 48, at Al; Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant, supra note 48, at Al. 
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confirm judges, therefore, can be ascribed to numerous people and 
entities who participated in the appointments process. 
In fairness, President Clinton did submit names for five 
openings on January 26, 1999, which is remarkable because his 
Senate impeachment trial was proceeding at the time. 53 The Chief 
Executive might have believed that it was futile to nominate 
additional candidates, given the slow pace at which the Senate was 
considering them. The Senate Judiciary Committee correspondingly 
did not conduct hearings on any of the nominees before the summer, 
while the Senate approved only two candidates prior to the 
November recess. 
It is also important to remember that limited action on the 9th 
Circuit vacancies in 1999 may well have been attributable to the 
ongoing, controversial debate over possible division of that court, a 
situation which closely resembles the circumstances in 1997.54 The 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, after studying the appellate system for a year, clearly and 
strongly recommended that Congress and the President not split the 
9th Circuit. 55 Instead, the commissioners proposed that lawmakers 
and the Chief Executive require three regionally-premised 
adjudicatory divisions for the 9th Circuit and authorize divisions for 
the remaining appellate courts as they increase in size. 56 These 
suggestions proved to be somewhat controversial; nevertheless, 
senators from the Pacific Northwest who had favored 9th Circuit 
bifurcation included the recommendations in proposed legislation 
introduced in January. 57 Uncertainty about, and dispute involving, 
the fate of this bill, and ultimately of the 9th Circuit, may have 
slowed Senate consideration of nominees for the court. However, it 
53. See supra note 47 and text accompanying note (recounting Clinton's 
nominations during this time). 
54. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1995) (proposing to establish the 
Commission of Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals). See 
generally Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 9 (noting that the Senate 
approved no new appointments the year after some senators proposed bifurcating 
the 9th Circuit). 
55. Commission Final Report, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
56. Id. at 40-52, 60-62 (outlining the Commission's recommendations 
regarding the divisional arrangement for the 9th Circuit, as well as its further 
suggestions regarding the divisional organization of the remaining Courts of 
Appeals). See generally Tobias, A Federal Appellate System, supra note 1 
(discussing the Commission's suggestions related to the 9th Circuit). 
57. S. 253, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1999). 
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is virtually impossible to demonstrate that advocates of either the 
divisional arrangement or of splitting the 9th Circuit have delayed 
the conformation of judicial nominees to place pressure on Congress 
to implement one of the approaches. 
Controversy also attended specific 9th Circuit openings. For 
instance, when Chief Justice Durham requested that President 
Clinton withdraw her nomination, there was substantial disagreement 
over who should select the candidate's replacement.58 Senator Slade 
Gorton (R-Wash.) insisted that he was entitled to choose the 
successor, but the Chief Executive did not accede to this demand. 
The dispute meant that the Clinton Administration did not submit a 
new nominee for the emp~ judgeship until shortly before the 
legislature recessed in 1999. 5 Controversy also accompanied efforts 
to designate someone for an unfilled seat that 1997 legislation had 
mandated be assigned to Hawaii as the only state in the circuit 
without a resident appellate judge. 60 The apparent inability of the 
Democratic party leadership in Hawaii to agree on a candidate 
prevented President Clinton from submitting a nominee until mid-
June. 61 
The significant number and prolonged character of the 
vacancies have imposed quite a few disadvantages. The openings 
have placed great pressure on the present active appellate judges, 
appellate judges who have assumed senior status, as well as on the 
active and senior district judges in the 9th Circuit. The active and 
senior appellate judges have been required to hear a larger number of 
oral arguments and write more opinions than they would have if the 
58. Lewis, supra note 46, at Al 8; Westneat, supra note 46, at B 1. 
59. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton 
Nominates James D. Whittemore and Richard C. Tallman to the Federal Bench 
(Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop. 
gov.us/>. 
60. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2493 (1997) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 44 (c) (1994)); see also Paul Elias, Clinton Submits Five Nominees for 9th 
Circuit, THE RECORDER, Jan. 27, 1999, at 1 (noting that a 1998 law requires that 
each state within a circuit be represented by a judge and discussing the difficulties 
in securing a candidate from Hawaii); Paul Elias, DOJ No. 3 Fisher Tapped for 
Ninth Circuit Opening, THE RECORDER, Mar. 16, 1999, at 2 (noting that the sole 
remaining seat on the 9th Circuit which did not have a nominee was ''reserved for 
a Hawaiian candidate"). 
61. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Clinton Nominates 
Maryanne Trump Barry, supra note 47 and text accompanying note (announcing 
the President's nomination of James E. Duffy). 
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9th Circuit possessed the full complement of judges to which it is 
entitled. 
The court might have applied certain measures permitting it 
to decide growing caseloads with deficient resources. For example, 
scarce resources may have required the 9th Circuit to grant fewer 
oral arguments and to publish written determinations in a smaller 
percentage of appeals. These circumstances could have prompted 
the judges to depend more on court personnel, namely staff attorneys 
and law clerks. Judges might even have had inadequate time to 
review petitions and briefs, to prepare for oral arguments, and to 
confer on, draft, circulate, and finalize opinions. 
Illustrative of the above problems is the 9th Circuit's 
significantly increased dependence on judges who are not active 
members of the court to staff three-judge panels. The 9th Circuit has 
a lengthy tradition of relying on the court's senior appellate and 
district judges, but the 9th Circuit has followed this practice with 
pronounced frequency since 1995. Indeed, the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals found that 
forty-three percent of the panels that resolved cases after oral 
argument in the court during 1997 had one judge who was not an 
active member of the 9th Circuit, a statistic that exceeded the 
national average by 10 percent. 62 It is difficult to delineate the 
precise effects of increased dependence on judges who are not active 
members of the 9th Circuit. Nonetheless, reliance on visiting jurists 
could have eroded collegiality, which may facilitate appellate 
disposition. Reliance on these non-member judges might 
correspondingly have reduced consistency and coherence in the case 
law of the circuit, because the visitors may have less familiarity with 
the court's substantive determinations and circuit traditions. 
This phenomenon could also have delayed the 9th Circuit's 
resolution of certain cases, thereby :frustrating the efforts of a court, 
which already encounters considerable difficulty in expediting 
treatment of the nation's largest appellate docket. A circuit that is 
attempting to function with only three-quarters of its authorized 
contingent will experience even more complications in promptly 
resolving appeals. Indeed, the numerous considerations examined 
above required the 9th Circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments during 
62. Commission Working Papers, supra note 6, at 108; see also Commission 
Final Report, supra note 1, at 31 (noting the circuit's use of visiting judges on its 
panels). 
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1997. This development imposed unnecessary expense and delay on 
the court, its judges, counsel, and parties. 
IV. Suggestions for Improving the 9th Circuit Situation 
The numerous judicial openings that currently exist in the 9th 
Circuit and their rather lengthy duration have seemingly had many 
detrimental impacts on the court. The federal executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches, and particularly President Clinton and the 
United States Senate, must, therefore, work closely together in 
efforts to confirm judges for every vacant position on the court as 
expeditiously as possible. 
A. An Introductory Word About the Commission 
Recommendations and the 9th Circuit Split 
Now that the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals has issued its final report and 
recommendations, Republican members of the Senate must not treat 
the debate over splitting the 9th Circuit as an obstacle to approving 
judges for the court. By clearly and forcefully articulating numerous 
persuasive arguments against the court's division, the expert, 
independent commissioners have essentially eliminated the issue of 
9th Circuit bifurcation as a reason to delay judicial selection. 
Moreover, the Commission's divisional approach would be less 
responsive to certain perceived deficiencies in 9th Circuit 
administration than the prompt confirmation of nominees for the 
court's vacancies. Prompt appointments may vitiate the need to 
experiment with the untested, potentially disruptive, divisional 
concept. Before Congress imposes an apparently ineffective 
divisional arrangement, legislators should at least approve the 9th 
Circuit's complete complement of 28 judges and carefully assess 
whether filling the vacant positions successfully addresses the 
difficulties detected by the Commission. Only if an expert, 
independent evaluator systematically collects, analyzes, and 
synthesizes empirical data on the court's operation at full capacity 
and definitively concludes that this remedy does not suffice, should 
lawmakers resort to the divisional idea. 
Regardless of how Congress resolves the controversies over 
the efficacy of the Commission's suggestions, and ultimately over 
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the court's possible division, these disputes should no longer serve as 
impediments to 9th Circuit appointments. Even if senators and 
representatives adopt the divisional arrangement proposed by the 
commissioners, bifurcate the court, or retain the status quo, none of 
these developments would alter the total number of steadily growing 
cases that appellate judges in the West must process. In the final 
analysis, the ccmtrove-rsies that implicate the Commission's 
proposals and possible 9th Circuit division should have limited 
relevance to filling the court's vacancies. 
B. Suggestions for the Senate 
GOP members, who constitute a majority in the Senate, could 
implement certain measures to facilitate the confirmation of judges 
for the six present openings on the 9th Circuit. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee and its chair, Senator Hatch, Senate Majority Leader 
Lott, and individual Republican senators, especially lawmakers who 
represent states that are located in the 9th Circuit where vacancies 
exist, might apply these approaches. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the panel chair, and all lawmakers who serve on this 
committee must re-institute the kind of concerted judicial selection 
efforts that they successfully employed throughout 1998. The 
process invoked during that year permitted the Senate to approve 65 
appellate and district court judges as well as five new members of 
the 9th Circuit. 
Now that the second session of the 106th Congress has 
convened, the Committee and Senator Hatch should expeditiously 
hold confirmation hearings on those candidates whom the panel had 
investigated but for whom it had failed to conduct hearings in 1999 
as well as on nominees whom President Clinton tenders during 2000. 
The Judiciary Committee and the chair must substantially modify the 
schedule that they employed in the first session of the 106th 
Congress, whereby no nominees for the 9th Circuit received hearings 
until the summer of 1999. The panel and Senator Hatch might even 
seek to change the method which they used throughout the 105th 
Congress, wherein only one appellate court candidate appeared at 
each hearing, and hearings were normally held only once a month.63 
63. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU 
L. REV. 309, 318 (1996) (discussing Senator Hatch's process for the confirmation 
of a judicial nominee); see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the 
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The Committee and the chair should seriously consider 
scheduling more than a single hearing every month or allowing 
multiple nominees for appeals court positions to testify in a 
particular hearing. The panel could consider holding a special 
hearing for several 9th Circuit candidates or entertain the idea of 
placing these nominees at the front of the queue. Indeed, the 
Committee and Senator Hatch might forego hearings for candidates 
who are not controversial because proceedings for such nominees are 
rather perfunctory. However, the symbolic and practical importance 
of appointments to the appellate courts, which are effectively the 
courts of last resort in the federal system because the Supreme Court 
grants so few petitions for certiorari, could make this suggestion 
unpalatable to certain senators. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee and Senator Hatch must 
schedule Committee hearings and votes on each candidate whom the 
president proffers, even if members of the Senate oppose individual 
nominees. These candidates should be permitted to testify, and the 
panel should discuss and vote on their suitability for the federal 
bench. The Chief Executive is entitled to tender the names of 
persons whom he thinks will serve with distinction on the courts; the 
President and nominees can expect that the candidates will receive 
hearings on the merits of their candidacies, as well as equitable 
consideration and fair votes. Subject to institutional restraints and 
conventional understandings of the Senate role in affording its 
advice and consent, the Judiciary Committee, panel members, and 
particular senators can thoroughly and rigorously probe nominees 
whom the Chief Executive submits. They may vote against those 
people whom the senators believe lack the requisite qualifications to 
serve as members of the appellate bench. For example, senators who 
think that candidates could be "activist judges" once on the court 
might wish to explore in confirmation hearings whether nominees 
may so behave after they are confirmed. 64 
Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997) 
(describing the confirmation hearing process and how often hearings are held). 
64. See 143 CONG. REC. 82515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of 
Senator Hatch suggesting that the primary criterion in the confirmation process 
might be to determine the political activism of the candidate). See, e.g., Judicial 
Activism: Defining the Problem and the Impact: Hearings on S.J. Reg. 26 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). 
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It is preferable to explore freely and openly in a public forum 
issues such as those examined above, especially if individual 
candidates favor doing so. However, certain nominees might want 
these questions to be asked in private. The possibilities of 
embarrassment, wasting scarce resources, or creating citizen 
disrespect for the process may suggest that public treatment is less 
beneficial or even undesirable. These circumstances will probably 
be unusual, and should be handled through private negotiations 
involving specific candidates, Senator Hatch, and President Clinton 
or their designees, and ought to honor the preferences of the 
nominees whose reputations can be at stake. 
The Senate Majority Leader should institute actions similar to 
those he apparently implemented in 1998 to facilitate the entire 
Senate's consideration of candidates whom the Judiciary Committee 
forwards. For instance, Senator Lott must schedule floor votes soon 
after receiving notification of panel approval. When slow processing 
can be attributed to controversy involving individual nominees, 
especially objections of the Majority Leader or specific members of 
the Senate, Senator Lott may want to allow greater floor debate and 
final votes on these candidates. For example, the floor debate in 
which members of the upper chamber participated before they voted 
on Judge Fletcher's confirmation promoted open and constructive 
exchange among senators. 65 
C. Suggestions for President Clinton 
President Clinton should implement measures that could 
expedite the appointment of judges for the six openings that 
currently exist on the 9th Circuit. The Clinton Administration 
tendered nominations for five of those vacancies immediately after 
the first session of the 106th Congress convened. 66 The Chief 
Executive should promptly forward nominees for the remaining 
65. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541, supra note 39 and accompanying text 
(containing Senator Biden's opinions on the judicial confirmation process); see 
also 143 CONG. REC. S2515-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (suggesting that floor 
debate over D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland elicited a similar exchange). 
66. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President Nominates Seventeen to 
the Federal Bench, supra note 46 and text accompanying note (announcing the 
nominations of Marsha Berzon, Barry Goode, Ronald Gould, Richard Paez, and 
Barbara Durham). 
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vacancy and should be prepared to submit names expeditiously as 
additional openings occur. 
The President can most felicitously encourage the 
confirmation of judges for the unfilled positions by continuing to 
follow several practices that he had implemented near the end of the 
initial session and during much of the second session of the 105th 
Congress. 67 President Clinton must identify and nominate people 
who are exceptionally well qualified and who will be considered 
acceptable by members of the Senate from states in which the empty 
seats arise, possibly by consulting closely with those solons about 
candidates. Typical is the Chief Executive's decision to submit the 
name of Magistrate Barry Silverman, whom the Republican Senators 
from Arizona, Jon Kyl and John McCain, clearly supported. 68 The 
Clinton Administration forwarded the nomination during early 
November 1997, Magistrate Judge Silverman testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on November 12th, and the panel 
approved the candidate on November 13th. 69 Congress recessed 
before the full Senate was able to vote on Silverman; however, he 
gained confirmation soon after the second session of the 105th 
Congress convened.70 
Therefore, the Chief Executive should seek out and nominate 
candidates who are intelligent and independent, who will work 
diligently, and who possess balanced judicial temperament. 
President Clinton may wish to consider tendering individuals who 
have moderate political viewpoints, perspectives shared by many 
nominees who were forwarded throughout both Clinton 
Administrations. 71 This approach would be responsive to the Senate 
67. See Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 3, at 541-42 (noting 
that throughout 1997, the Clinton Administration steadily and with increased speed 
forwarded names of nominees). 
68. See OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY, supra notes 36, 40 and accompanying 
text. 
69. See Adrianne Flynn, Arizona Lawmakers Post Wins as Session Ends; 
Actions Include Court Nominee, Key Bills Passed, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 
1997, at A2 (predicting Senate approval of Silverman's appointment before the 
recess); Senate Dems Put Judge Pick on Hold, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1997, 
at Bl (reporting on the hold placed on Silverman's appointment). 
70. See supra note 39 (reporting on Silverman's confirmation). 
71. See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: 
Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 255 (1997) (describing the nominees 
for both of Clinton's administrations); Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior 
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Judiciary Committee chair and a number of Republican senators who 
have forcefully and repeatedly stated that they will not vote for 
persons whom they believe might be "activist judges." This could 
well become a political necessity in a presidential election year. 72 
Although it should not be dispositive, previous service on the 
federal or state bench constitutes valuable experience. For example, 
Judge Wallace Tashima and Judge Kim Wardlaw had been well-
respected members of the Central District of California before the 
Clinton Administration elevated them to the 9th Circuit. People who 
have served on the federal or state courts bring the benefit of that 
experience, and most federal district judges can be rather readily 
confirmed, as they have already secured Senate approval. President 
Clinton might consider continuing to submit the names of current 
district judges who are Republican appointees, such as Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor, because the GOP Senate majority should be favorably 
disposed toward the candidacies of these jurists.73 
The Chief Executive must also work closely with Senator 
Hatch on appointments. The Clinton Administration ought to solicit 
the Chair's advice and recommendations, even if Executive Branch 
officials depart from the counsel that the Senator affords. The 
President should correspondingly consult with additional members 
of the Judiciary Committee and senators from states in which there 
are vacancies, because these lawmakers can be critical to the 
confirmation process, as they seemingly were in Arizona.74 Neither 
the administration nor Senator Hatch should allow disputes, such as 
of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 18 (1996) 
(discussing Clinton's ideology in nominating judges). 
72. See, e.g., Elias, Berzon 's Ninth Circuit Bid, supra note 51; Orrin G. 
Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
1997, at A15; Savage, Political Logjam, supra note 22; Judicial Activism, supra 
note 64 and text accompanying note. 
73. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, President 
Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to the Federal Bench (June 25, 1997) 
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/>; see also 
Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3 (stating that Judge Sotomayor was confirmed for 2nd 
Circuit). But see supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text (referring to Senator 
Hatch's complaints of renominated individuals who were controversial or viewed 
as "activist judges"). 
74. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the desire of 
Republican Senators from Arizona and Washington to have greater input into 
potential judicial nominees). 
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the controversy that arose over the Utah district court vacancy, to 
stymie the judicial selection process.75 The Chief Executive and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee chair might follow the constructive 
approach which they used in 1998, as both must seek the maximum 
possible consensus and refrain from imposing unreasonable 
demands. 
Should these recommendations, which can aptly be described 
as conciliatory, not work, the Clinton Administration could 
implement less cooperative measures. For example, the President 
might use his office as a bully pulpit from which to charge 
Republican senators with confirming only two 9th Circuit judges in 
1999 or perhaps to embarrass lawmakers into facilitating 
appointments. The Chief Executive could also force the issue of 
slowed judicial selection by taking the question to the American 
people. President Clinton might even invoke the notion of recess 
appointments, or proffer the prospect of bipartisan judicial 
appointments, in exchange for passage of legislation authorizing 
more judgeships.76 These possibilities could pressure the Senate to 
expedite the judicial selection process by publicizing how the 
number and prolonged nature of openings can erode justice and the 
significance of expeditiously confirming additional judges. 77 
The serious circumstances that presently exist in the 9th 
Circuit clearly warrant implementation of the ideas proposed. 
75. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged delaying 
tactics that Senator Hatch used to influence the selection of Republican Ted 
Stewart as a judicial nominee). 
76. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 
bane) (1985) (holding that the President may constitutionally confer temporary 
federal judicial commissions during a recess of Senate pursuant to recess 
appointment clause); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 
1962) (holding that the President's constitutional authority to make interim 
appointments includes authority to appoint "temporary" judges); Thomas A. 
Curtis, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984) (suggesting the 
constitutionality of recess appointments); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 71, at 
272 (suggesting that President Clinton invoke the ideas in the text); Neil A. Lewis, 
Clinton Agrees to GOP Deal in Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1998, at Al 
(discussing bipartisan judicial selection). 
77. Although this Article does not necessarily champion the ideas in this or 
the preceding sentence, President Clinton must be realistic about filling vacancies 
and should calculate their significance generally and in the 9th Circuit, especially 
during an election year. 
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"Fundamental concepts of fairness and due process"78 require that 
the judges of this appellate court have responsibility for caseloads 
similar to those of their colleagues in the remaining appeals courts. 
Lawyers and parties in the 9th Circuit should not have to wait 
substantially longer for appellate resolution than their counterparts in 
other courts. In the end, the 9th Circuit's troubling situation should 
lead Republican and Democratic senators, as well as President 
Clinton, to rise above partisan politics and confirm judges for the 
court. 
V. Conclusion 
The 9th Circuit presently has vacancies in nearly one-quarter 
of the court's 28 authorized judgeships, even as the court 
experiences a docket that continues to increase in magnitude and 
complexity. The inability, or reluctance, to appoint judges for these 
openings has undermined appellate justice in the 9th Circuit. 
Members of the Senate and President Clinton must work 
cooperatively, so that they can promptly approve judges for these 
empty seats. 
78. Pub. L. No. 105-119, 305(a)(l)(B)(iii), 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997). 
